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The first glimmerings of Western water law followed the miners who
inundated the Sierra foothills after the discovery of gold in January 1848.
The '49ers diverted water from streams for their placer mining works, and
"mining districts" and other community institutions sprang up to govern
rights, maintain order and enforce the rules and customs of the various
communities.
Prominent among these rules and customs was the notion that prior
mining claims had to be respected by those who came later. The same
applied to water rights: The miner who diverted water for his placer works
could not interfere with the water supply of an earlier miner; by the same
token, his use should be secure against interference by a subsequent water
user. And so the English common law doctrine of riparian rights (equality
and sharing of reasonable uses of water) was replaced by the doctrine of
prior appropriation (first in time, first in right).
These miners were trespassers on the federal domain and converters
(that is, thieves) of federal minerals, so some miners were removed from
their claims, pursuant to a writ issued by President Lincoln in 1863. After
Nevada was admitted to the Union in 1864, however, that state's Senator
William M. Stewart pushed through Congress the Lode Mining Act of
1866, which confirmed and legitimized the miners' customs and usages,
including their appropriation of water on the public domain. Senator
Stewart was protecting the Comstock Lode, discovered in 1859. Congress
broadened this legislation with the 1870 Placer Mining Act, which put
homesteaders on notice that they were subject to all of these prior water
uses. The Desert Land Act of 1877 provided for settlement of Western
lands and for the use of water for land development, under the doctrine of
prior appropriation.
These federal laws might not have been given retroactive effect but for
the 1879 case of Broder v. Natoma Water Co., in which the U.S. Supreme
Court said of the Lode Mining Act:
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• . . rights of miners . .. and the rights of persons who had
constructed canals and ditches to be used in mining operations
and for purposes of agricultural irrigation•., are rights which
the government had, by its conduct, recognized and encouraged
and was bound to protect, before the passage of the act of 1866.
We are of opinion that the act was rather a voluntary recognition
of a pre-existing right of possession, constituting a valid claim to
its continued use, than the establishment of a new one. (Empha-
sis by the Court)
With the exception of Hawaii, all of the Western states adopted the
doctrine of prior appropriation, in total or in part. The Pacific Coast states
and the Plains states retained common law riparian rights in a strange
combination of the two doctrines until they discovered it was impossible to
administer these mutually inconsistent systems. Ironically, only in Califor-
nia, where appropriation rights in the West were born, can a person still
commence a new use of water under the doctrine of riparian rights; in 1988,
the California Supreme Court held that the United States government has
California riparian rights for land reserved as national forest. But even in
California, the prospect of developing new riparian uses is more theoretical
than practical because of limitations placed on such new uses by that state's
courts.
The Rocky Mountain states and Nevada simply never recognized the
doctrine of riparian rights, so prior appropriation became the exclusive
means of acquiring a water right. These states considered this doctrine the
only one suitable for the arid conditions within their boundaries because it
allowed people to divert water out of water courses for use on non-riparian
land. Moreover, it protected existing or prior investments in water use
against subsequent uses and changes. Montana was one of these states.
As in other Western states, an appropriation was accomplished in
Montana merely by putting the water to some beneficial use, such as
mining, irrigation or turning an arrastra for milling ore. It was not
uncommon for a person to post a notice at the point of intended diversion as
a way to stake out a claim before commencing actual work, but such
posting was not necessary to acquire a legal right. The right had a priority
the day the work commenced.
Throughout the West, legislatures recognized the desirability of a
permanent record of water rights so that people could tell how many rights
there were on a particular source and their amounts and priority dates.
Such information was essential to current holders of water rights, people
who might be considering a new appropriation and those contemplating
purchase of property to which a water right attached. The latter was
particularly important because the potential buyer would want to know the
value of the right, which would depend on its volume and its priority in
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relation to other water rights.
Thus, in 1885, the Montana legislature enacted-a law providing:
Any person hereafter desiring to appropriate... MUST post a
notice... at the point of intended diversion... [and] SHALL file
with the county clerk.., a notice of appropriation ... verified by
affidavit... [and] MUST proceed to prosecute the work... etc.
(Emphasis added.)
Notwithstanding that language, the Montana Supreme Court held in
1897 that compliance with the statute was purely optional: One's priority
would date from the posting of a notice at the time of diversion, whereas one
who did not comply with the statute would have a priority dating from the
time of completion.
From 1897 until 1973, then, a water right on an unadjudicated stream
(that is, almost all of the streams in Montana) could be acquired by
following or ignoring the statute and putting the water to a beneficial use.
Thus, there were a vast number of water rights for which there was no
record of any kind. ,
But what of the record of rights where the statute had been followed?
It is important to note that the statute required the would-be appropriators
to post and file before doing the necessary work. What quantity should they
claim in their posting and filing? It only made sense to claim the maximum
that might possibly be developed. That, combined with widespread
ignorance of the volume of water in the source or that a ditch might carry,
led to the filing of grossly excessive claims, totally unrelated to the actual
amount finally diverted- or used.
There was yet another source of inaccuracy in the statutory method.
Suppose the prospective appropriator properly posted and filed, became
interested in something else, and never completed his appropriation? In
such cases, the official records still exist and show a water right that was
never consummated. A record without a right!
Water users on some Montana streams sued each other often enough
over water rights in a limited or discrete geographic area that the creek or
stretch of stream ,was considered "adjudicated." In 1921, the state
legislature provided that the exclusive means of acquiring a right on such
sources was through a court proceeding, in which the new appropriator
would serve notice on the prior litigants and seek to have his new right
added to the prior decree. A few would-be appropriators learned in later
litigation that the stream from which they began taking water after 1921
was an "adjudicated" stream and that they had no water rights. Indeed, on
the Sun River, on which there were early adjudications and decrees, a
ranch is now objecting to the validity of water uses commenced after 1921
without compliance with the statute.
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But even adjudication did not result in settlement of disputes. People
not involved in a particular lawsuit could flout the orders of the water
commissioner and the district judge. The "adjudication" could not affect
people not joined in the action. Even if an individual was a party to the
lawsuit, only one of his water rights may have been contested; his
unadjudicated rights could cause later trouble and require further litiga-
tion. In addition, as expressed by the Montana Supreme Court in the 1926
case of Anaconda National Bank v. Johnson:
Experience has shown that after the right of all of the parties
taking water from a stream had been adjudicated, a subsequent
appropriator would appear upon the scene, tap the stream and
ruthlessly take the water, disregarding the decreed rights and
flaunting the orders of the commissioner appointed by the court
to distribute the water according to the terms of the decrees. The
only remedy the prior appropriators had was to commence a suit
against the new appropriator, the result being that all of the
rights of the stream had again to be adjudicated,- and after that
decree was entered, if another subsequent appropriator took the
water the same process had to be gone over again . . .
That particular case involved the waters of Dempsey Creek, a small
Powell County stream less than 20 miles long, which supplies about 20
farmers and ranchers. They have endured 14 lawsuits with eight decisions
by the Montana Supreme Court.
This is the dismal picture of Montana water-rights law before 1973:
"use rights" for which there were no records, statutory filings with
unreliable information about quantity and whether the right had even been
developed, and streams with a history of multiple litigation but no certain
or final outcome.
As a consequence of this unruly situation, the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention mandated a system of centralized records, and
the 1973 legislature enacted the Water Use Act. The act requires anyone
who wants a water right to file a permit application with the state
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). The
DNRC notifies other users and, if necessary, holds a hearing. It can then
grant, deny or modify the requested permit. This method is exclusive, so
new rights after July 1, 1973 have been and are considered and regulated
by the DNRC.
That left all of the pre-1973 water rights. The Water Use Act
established a system of water right adjudication to ensure both certainty
and finality. Originally, its provisions were administered by the DNRC,
which gathered information and notified claimants. There was no judicial
involvement until the agency completed its determination and filed it with
a petition in the local district court. There was concern, however, that an
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adjudication commenced by an agency might be classified as an adminis-
trative proceeding and would not qualify under the federal McCarran
Amendment to permit the determination of federal and Indian (reserved)
water rights in state courts. The procedure was thus changed slightly in
1975, requiring the DNRC to obtain a district court order at the outset to
commence an adjudication, so that its action became, technically, a
judicial proceeding.
It was still up to the DNRC to select and specify the areas or sources
that would be involved in a particular adjudication; gather all manner of
data from various sources; make on-site inspections, surveys, reconnais-
sance and investigations; obtain, through the district court order men-
tioned above declarations by claimants of their rights; compile and analyze
the data; and organize it and file it with a petition in district court. The
district court then rendered a preliminary decree based on the filed data. A
copy was served on everyone involved and those who had objections could
require a hearing. If there were no objections, the preliminary decree
became final; otherwise, a final decree was issued after the hearing. The
decree was final and conclusive to all rights in the source or area: There
were no rights except those stated in the decree.
Shortly after the July 1, 1973 effective date of the Water Use Act, the
DNRC commenced a proceeding to determine all of the water rights to the
Powder River. Progress was slow: The agency had the burden of ascertain-
ing rights, many of them long unused and difficult to find, and the project
was understaffed and underfunded. In 1979, the Powder River proceeding
was only about half completed.
The pace of the Powder River proceeding raised fears that a century or
more might be needed to adjudicate Montana water rights, and the DNRC
sought significant legislative changes in funding and procedure. Anxiety
was intensified by three suits over adjudication of Montana streams, filed
in 1975 in federal courts, and by the 1979 filing of four additional federal
suits by the U.S. Department of Justice.
The Montana legislature desperately wanted the adjudication to be in
state not federal courts. But the Powder River case raised fear that the
existing Montana system was inadequate and could not be used to suspend
the federal cases. So, after a two-year interim study, the legislature enacted
Senate Bill 76 in 1979. The bill partitioned the state into four immense
water divisions: the Missouri and its tributaries below the mouth of the
Marias, the Missouri and tributaries from the Marias to the Missouri
headwaters, the entire Yellowstone drainage, and the waters west of the
Continental Divide. Each division has a water judge, assisted by a water
master (referred to collectively as the Water Court); all of the water
masters are based in Bozeman and supervised by the chief water judge.
One of the major changes made by SB 76 shifted the burden of
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ascertaining what rights existed from the DNRC to the claimants
themselves. Anyone claiming a water right had to file a statement of the
claim by 5 p.m., April 30, 1982, or his claim would be conclusively
presumed to be abandoned. That provision allowed the Water Court to
begin working on filed claims, thus freeing the DNRC from the responsi-
bility of doing extensive field work to try to ferret out all possible claims.
The aforementioned federal suits in the federal courts have been
suspended, pursuant to a decree from the U.S. Supreme Court, but may be
revived and the adjudications taken over by the federal courts if the state
court proceedings prove to be inadequate, inaccurate or unfair. Federal
and Indian (reserved) water right claims are not yet a part of the
proceedings in the Water Court. SB 76 created a Reserved Water Rights
Compact Commission to negotiate and quantify those rights, and the
claims are suspended from adjudication in the Water Court while
negotiations for a compact are being pursued.
The legislature seems inclined to grant extensions of time for
negotiations as long as there is hope for settlement. One such compact has
been completed: the Fort Peck-Montana Compact, between the state of
Montana and the Assiniboine and Sioux tribes of the Fort Peck Reserva-
tion in May 1985. The agreement quantified and settled the relative rights
of the parties to the waters of the Missouri River, its tributaries, including
the Milk River, and groundwater.*
Rights settled in this manner will have to be integrated into the
decrees rendered by the Water Court. If there is a stalemate with one or
more of the indian tribes or with the federal government, Montana's law
would require that their rights be litigated like other rights in the Water
Court. That would raise the specter of federal court jurisdiction and
supremacy if challenged by the tribes or the federal government, if these
two entities choose to allege that the state court proceedings are inpractice
inadequate, inaccurate or unfair.
The biggest change made by SB 76 was that the adjudication process,
instead of remaining a gradual and long-lasting process of settling rights on
one stream or stretch of river at a time, suddenly became a catalog of more
than 203,000 pre-1973 water rights claimed statewide, with multiple
adjudications going on simultaneously at a greatly accelerated pace. The
magnitude and scope of this process was unprecedented in Montana and,
indeed, Western water law.
Not surprisingly, there have been considerable difficulties in imple-
menting such an enormous task. The law is unclear about how accurate the
* [Eds.: A second tribal-state agreement was reached by Montana and the Northern Cheyenne




results must be, particularly to satisfy federal requirements to maintain
jurisdiction for adjudicating federal and Indian (reserved) rights. The
legislature has asked the Water Court to expedite the process, but it is
unclear at what point haste becomes an invitation for inaccuracy.
Some of the possible problems encountered- are illustrated by the
allegations in Petitions for Writs of Supervisory Control, that is, petitions
to have the Montana Supreme Court exercise supervision and give
directions to the Water Court. These petitions have been filed by state and
federal agencies, public utilities and private parties.
One such petition alleges that on a creek with an average annual flow
of 10.4 cubic feet per second (cfs), one ranch was granted 110.4 cfs, even
though the ranch's combined hydraulic capacity, with three diversions,
was only 9 cfs. That 110.4 cfs included 24.38 cfs for coke ovens and mining
that had ceased about 1910, 7.38 cfs for the town of Electric, which no
longer exists, and 13.75 cfs for a long-defunct power plant. Another
claimant was granted 2.5 cfs for mining by "pan or other container" (2.5
cfs is 1,122 gallons per minute - a lot of water to handle by such means).
It is also alleged that the Water Court has accepted "late filings," that
is, claims filed after the April 30, 1982 deadline. Specifically, the petition
alleges that the Water Court accepted four filings by one ranch on July 22,
1985, more than three years after the statutory deadline. According to a
petition by the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (which legally
represents the public interest in prior or existing public recreational use of
water):
As of April 3, 1985, the Water Court has accepted 2,041 late
water right claims filed after the April 30, 1982 deadline. Three
hundred fifty-eight (358) late claims have been included in
preliminary and temporary preliminary decrees used by the
Water Court without giving notice to other water users in the
affected basin that the claims were filed late.
Subsequent to this petition, the Water Court included a remark in the
Preliminary or Temporary Degree that indicates that the filing was late.
The adequacy of that remedy can be judged by what follows.
The Water Court has claimed that it relies on an "objection process;"'
that is, it relies on rival claimants to file objections to erroneous,
exaggerated or invalid claims or rights included in Preliminary or
Temporary Preliminary Decrees. But the parties to a decree. are not
apprised of their relative priority or of the amounts of water decreed to
prior appropriators. Thus, they have no information on which to base
objections. Most will not know what is in the decree because they don't
realize the importance of reviewing the entire decree or at least the details
on rights decreed prior to theirs, to do so entails time and the probable
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expense of hiring a lawyer and technical experts.
Notices of Temporary Preliminary and Preliminary Decrees include a
statement that the claimant should examine the decree; that his right may
be subject to other rights; that he can either buy a copy of the decree and the
indexes or go to a DNRC office or the local clerk of court and inspect them;
and that making this effort is extremely important. Each decree abstract
sent to each claimant also advises checking on the relative priority of the
right. To follow that suggestion, the claimant might have to wade through
and understand several feet of computer printout.
In addition, there is little verification information available because
the Water Court limited DNRC's role and involvement in inspection and
verification of claims (only 20 actual field investigations were made
through the end of 1985). Even with the warnings in the decrees and the
abstracts, the system discourages and diminishes objections, expediting
the process, but at a price.
The Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks petition alleges that:
Some claims are denied without citation of evidence or legal authority
while other claims are granted even in the face of DNRC verification
information indicating that the claims are inflated, exaggerated or bogus.
Late claims are granted without public notice and to the detriment of
those claimants who filed timely claims.
Irrigation claims have been reviewed, granted and denied under numerous
and different volume and acreage standards.
Flow rate and volume have not been quantified for storage, fish and
wildlife claims even though such information is submitted as part of the
water right applications. (The 1987 legislation may have made it unneces-
sary to decree fish and wildlife claims by volume, but stock ponds and
reservoirs still require such description.)
The Water Court is serving as both the adversary and judge in water right
hearings. The Water Court has improperly prejudged and determined
that the Department's instream recreational claims are invalid before
hearing and without citing admissible evidence or legal authority.
The Water Court has prohibited DNRC from field-investigating ques-
tionable claims and has failed to develop procedures for the identification
of abandonment, enlargement of water rights and non-perfection offiled
appropriation rights as issues affecting the validity of water rights in the
adjudication process . . . [which] will result in exaggerated or invalid
water right claims being granted, jeopardizing the legal validity of the
final decrees and denying the Department due process of law.
The Water Court has failed to prioritize and fully define the nature and
extent of individual water rights... The abstracts of individual rights do
not indicate what priority each individual's water right may have under
the 'first in time,first in right" doctrine. The Department submits that the
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Water Court's failure to prioritize and fully define the nature and.extent
of individual water rights in relation to other senior and junior rights in
the basin makes the final decrees unenforceable and will result in
substantial further litigation.
*. : The Water Court is directly involved in the review of claims and is
engaged in direct contact with claimants. Of course, the Water Court also
determines whether its preliminary review of the claims is accurate or,
valid.
The Water Court is appearing as an objector to claims in the adjudication
process. Of course, the Water Court will also determine whether the
Water Court's objection is valid.
Subsequent to the filing of the petitions referred to or quoted above,
the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, the DNRC, the Montana
Attorney General, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Montana Power
Company, Trout Unlimited, the Washington Water Power Company,
several individuals and ranches and the Montana Water Court signed a
stipulation containing a summary of its content:
The parties and amici have recommended a process for resolv-
ing the substantive legal question in the most expeditious
manner possible. Where procedural issues are involved, the
parties and amici have recommended changes in Water Court
procedures and policies that constitute a settlement of the
procedural matters in dispute or have recommended a process
for resolving the procedural issues. The Water Court has
accepted the recommendations.
The stipulation deals with the matters discussed or quoted in this
article. Some matters appear to be resolved, some have been settled by
compromise, while others were left for adjudication by a water judge or by
the Montana Supreme Court. As is the case in some complex documents,
the stipulation gives more the appearance of mutual understanding than is
actually the case. Some of the parties to the stipulation have stated that
many of the problems are recurring.
To help resolve some of its own continuing concerns about the water
rights adjudication process, the 1987 legislature ordered a review of the
process to commence in September 1987 and conclude at the end of
September 1988. The law firm hired to conduct the review was to report to
the legislative Water Policy Committee and is also expected to meet with
the 1989 legislature. The draft report, conducted by the Denver law firm of
Saunders, Snyder, Ross and Dickson, commenced by noting that:
We were not asked by the Water Policy Committee to provide
performance evaluations, but rather to address institutional
issues.
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With that limitation, the report states:
We did not find the framework of the Montana Water Adjudica-
tion law or the process prescribed by it to be so grievouslyflawed
as to require a massive legislative overhaul.
In short, the report finds that the claims examination procedures of
the DNRC are adequate, efficient and useful for the Water Court;
claimants have adequate access to information; the Water Courts are
highly efficient and provide adequate procedures for resolving disputed
claims; and the process, so far, is adequate to adjudicate federal and tribal
claims under the McCarran Amendment.
The report recognizes that the Water Court has accepted late claims
and even included them in decrees. It disapproves of this practice and
concludes that the decrees are void to the extent that they include such
claims but are otherwise valid.
Claimants, objectors and interested parties have enough notice of
each step of the procedures, the report finds, although decrees adjudicating
sub-basins may affect water users in other sub-basins within a drainage or
users on the main stream. It is therefore recommended that further notice
be given to all who could be affected within the larger drainage area and
that more time be allowed for objections.
The report argues that:
Some litigants feel that they have been foreclosed from
participation in decisions on issues which the Water Court may
later apply to their claims. However, all litigants have an
opportunity through the objection process and the appellate
process to seek the correction of what they perceive to be errors
of law or fact which may be applied TO THEIR CLAIMS. The
fact that THEY MAY NOT HAVE had an opportunity to
litigate such issues WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS OF
OTHERS does not deprive them of the right to litigate such
matters fully WITH RESPECT TO THEIR OWN CLAIMS.
(Emphasis added.)
Does this discussion adequately consider the interrelationship of
water rights - that is, that what has been done to another person's right in
the same source may drastically affect one's own right? Or that a claimant
or litigant will remain ignorant of other cases which may involve issues that
the claimant or litigant is also concerned with and which will affect or even
determine the outcome of his own claim or case?
Another issue addressed by the report is the Water Court's constitu-
tionality. In a recent issue of the Montana Law Review, DNRC chief legal
counsel Donald Maclntyre pointed out that each of the four water judges
presides over all of the judicial districts within his water division. Each
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water judge, who must be a district judge or retired district judge, is
selected by a majority vote of district judges within his water division. He is
an integral part of Montana's system of judicial district courts.
But the Montana constitution requires that the district courts be an
elected judiciary, except for a judge or individual qualified to serve as judge
pro tempore. The latter is appointed by the chief justice to serve on a
temporary assignment to a particular case to relieve an overburdened
district court. The water judges do not fit that exception; neither are they
elected by the constituency they serve, except coincidentally when a water
judge who is a district judge presides over a case within his water division
which also happens to be within his judicial district. Outside his judicial
district, he has no electoral constituency, and a retired judge has none
anywhere. Mr. Maclntyre therefore questioned the constitutionality of the
Water Court.
The water policy report argues that although the water courts have
the status of district courts, they do not perform the same functions or deal
with the same subject matter, so they are special courts created by the
legislature and thus not subject to the constitutional provisions that
governs the election of judges to the district courts. The issue obviously is
not resolved.
The report uses a survey of claimants' opinions to draw some
conclusions, among them:
The majority of claims have not been objected to by other users,
and this is consistent with the finding that the majority of users
are not aware of the nature ofrights claimed by other users from
the same source.
Another survey was conducted of attorneys identified by the water courts,
the Water Policy Committee staff and the DNRC as being active in the
practice of water law. The report's conclusions from the survey include the
following:
Approximately 74 percent of -the responding attorneys
report that the current adjudication process does not provide
them or their clients sufficient notice of the claims of other water
users so that investigations can be completed in time to file
appropriate objections.
Approximately 77 percent of the responding attorneys
report the DNRC examination of claims materially increases
the accuracy of the adjudication process, and 50 percent of the
responding attorneys report that such DNRC examinations
always or often result in material modifications of claims in
issued decrees.
Approximately 77 percent of the attorneys report the
DNRC examination should be utilized much more often by the
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water courts.
Only 35 percent of the responding attorneys report that the
decrees issued by the water courts constitute accurate adjudica-
tions of water rights with greater than 50 percent accuracy.
These conclusions, drawn from the group that has observed and
worked with the adjudication process most intimately (although it is
admittedly a small group) are not reflected in the water policy report itself.
This may be because the report does not purport to provide "performance
evaluations," but it is an unfortunate weakness.
Notwithstanding the above disclaimer, the water policy report con-
tains many opinions and conclusions about performance. But, most
fundamentally, the report does not settle the questions concerned with the
accuracy of the decrees and equal treatment of claimants. This leaves the
most important questions unanswered.
ADDENDUM: In October 1988, the draft report was superseded by a final
report which contains further documentation, argument and drafts of
legislation to improve the adjudication procedures. It does not, however,
make any changes that require revision of this article.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS
Activities of the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation.
1987. 740 P.2d 1096 (Mont.).
Anaconda National Bank v. Johnson. 1926. 75 M. 401, 244 Pac. 141
(Mont.).
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe. 1983. 103 S. Ct. 3201.
Broder v. Natoma Water Co. 1879. 101 U.S. 17.
Donich v. Johnson. 1926. 77 M. 229, 250 Pac. 963 (Mont.).
Fort Peck-Montana Compact. 1985. Montana Code Annotated, Sec.
85-20-201.
MACINTYRE, D. 1988. The Adjudication of Montana's Waters - A
Blueprint for Improving the Judicial Process. 49 Montana Law Review
211.
The McCarran Amendment. 1952. 43 USC 666 (1976).
Mettlerv. Ames Realty Co. 1921.61 M. 152, 201 Pac. 702 (Mont.).
Montana Water Use Act. 1973. Montana Code Annotated, Title 85,
Ch. 2, Parts 1-4.
Murray v. Tingley. 1897. 20 M. 260, 50 Pac. 712 (Mont.).
Reserved Water Rights Commission. 1979. Montana Code Anno-
tated, Sec. 2-15-212.
Revised Codes of Montana. 1947. Sections 89-810-812 (1885).
Revised Codes of Montana. 1947. Section 89-815 (1885).
Revised Codes of Montana. 1947. Section 89-829 (1921).
[Vol. 12
1991] MONTANA WATER ADJUDICATIONS 39
SAUNDERS, SNYDER, ROSS AND DICKSON, P.C. 1988. Evaluation of
Montana's Water Rights Adjudication Process. Draft Report. Water
Policy Committee, Montana Legislature, Helena.
Senate Bill 76, 1979, Montana Code Annotated, Title 85, Ch. 2.
State ex rel Reeder v. District Court. 1935. 100 M. 376, 47 P.2d 653
(Mont.).
STONE, A. 1957. Are There Any Adjudicated Streams in Montana?
19 Montana Law Review 19.
STONE, A. 1969. The Long Count on Dempsey. 31 Montana Law
Review 1.
STONE, A. 1981. Montana Water Law for the 1980s; 1988 Supple-
ment. School of Law, University of Montana, Missoula.
United States v. Castillero. 1862. 67 U.S. 17.
United States v. Parrott. 1858. Fed. Cas. 15, 998 (C.C. Calif.).
In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System. 1988. 749 P.2d 324.
In re Water of Long Valley Creek. 1979. 599 P. 2d 656 (Calif.).

